THE New Republic

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The Future of Formosa

By MICHAEL LINDSAY

Eleanor Roosevelt's Life

By DONALD MEYER

NEW FACES IN POLITICS

Promising Congressional Candidates in Connecticut, California, Minnesota, Pennsylvania

OCTOBER 6, 1958

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Washington Wire

Power in the Palace

EISENHOWER'S handling of the Sherman Adams affair set political teeth on edge. (Professional politicians have pride in their craft that transcends partisanship.) This is what the President did. It was patent last June that Adams had violated his own code and must go. The President, who doesn't understand public opinion, couldn't see it. Once having retained him, however, the next best thing was to be firm and bold. But Eisenhower weakened and dropped Adams at the worst time, the start of the midterm campaign, handing over the corruptibility issue to the opponents. Adams' farewell TV splurge centered maximum attention on the matter which until then had pretty much quieted down; Adams' charge that he was a victim of a conspiracy (Democratic) emphasized that it was really the panicky GOP candidates who were knifing him. Finally, Eisenhower never did condemn Adams. This implied that the President was either (a) weakly yielding to the "conspiracy" pressure without moral cause, or (b) condoning a double standard of Administration morality. In sum —a textbook illustration of how not to run politics.

General Persons won't really "succeed" Adams. He is a mellow, genial operator, neither strong enough emotionally nor physically to be an iron man. Chances are there will be a redistribution of Palace Guard power; ultimate beneficiaries (our guess) — quiet, powerful Treasury Secretary Bob Anderson and Richard Nixon, who has often found himself thwarted and blocked by Adams. Hagerty's alliance was with Adams, and his influence may be lessened.

(Reflection: The last three Presidents each taught us something — Franklin Roosevelt that one man can be President indefinitely; Truman that anybody can be President; and Eisenhower that we can get on without having any President.)

We don't see the *Saturday Evening Post* very often and it is our misfortune. Unfortunately we have little time for pictures and light entertainment. It is true the *Post* has a solemn editorial page, but does anybody read it? It is like *Life* magazine—it has a huge circulation and no audience. We noted in the October 4 issue its reaction to Formosa. "The Eisenhower-Dulles firm stand," it wrote, "so mercilessly attacked by the liberal Left, deserves united support." Well, well, that "liberal Left" is still mercilessly attacking, is it? Among those who have recently attacked the Eisenhower-Dulles policy are the *Washington Star, The New York Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. Many of us regard these papers as fairly conservative, but everything, of course, is to the Left of old grandmaw *Post*.

Closer and Closer

WE HAVE A NOTION that the Administration, if it dared, would throw the American flag over Quemoy and Matsu. It would declare that anybody who disagreed with Dulles was unpatriotic. We see tendencies of this peeping out all around. New York's GOP Senatorial candidate, Kenneth Keating, for example, charges his opponent has "unwittingly" aided Red China by questioning Dulles' policy and that *Izvestia* has quoted Dean Acheson with approval. Helping the Reds, you see.

GOP National Chairman Meade Alcorn comes closer and closer to this position. To assume it directly, however, would be a mark of desperation, and we do not think the Administration will get that far. The plain fact is that war over Quemoy would be the most unpopular war in American history. The staggering thing is how near we are to it.

With his flair for publicity Nixon directed attention to his own first swing of the political campaign. He did this by issuing an advance statement denouncing the State Department "subordinate" who had disclosed that mail is running overwhelmingly against the Dulles' policy. It was a "patent and deliberate effort" to "undercut" and "sabotage" the Secretary, Nixon said. This was a deft maneuver with fine timing. It implied that the bad old security risks are still hard at work in the State Department. It implied that protest letters are maybe unpatriotic too; designed "to surrender our position of world leadership to the Communists." Without saying so exactly it implied that, at a time like this, we must all rally round, whistle "Stars and Stripes Forever" and stand with heads bare and hand on heart when Dulles is mentioned. We don't know how far the "new Nixon" will go in his present campaign speeches, but obviously there is a wonderful opportunity for his talents.

The Byrd Way

ABC BROADCASTER Edward P. Morgan revealed last week the very practical basis on which arch-conservative Democratic Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia runs his apple business — the Department of Agriculture calls him "the biggest single grower in the United States." The "Byrd machine" is also called the tightest political organization in the country. He is a rosy-gilled aristocrat who believes in clean government (by Byrd henchmen), a balanced budget, and enough racism to keep his machine in power.

There are 68,000 unemployed in Virginia, but does Byrd hire them as apple pickers? Goodness, no! For 10 years Byrd's Frederick County Fruit Growers Association, Morgan reports, has imported Bahaman migrant labor, under contract. There are more there this fall than ever before. Theoretically local job offers went begging at the "prevailing orchard wage," so migrants had to be hired. But the joker here is that the growers themselves manage to depress the prevailing wage by the very availability of migrant help.

It is a wonderful system, any way you look at it. Virginia Negroes generally can't vote, so nobody cares about *them*. Imported blacks without vote keep wage levels down. They live in sties and hovels and may gross $54 for a 60-hour week. This compares favorably with slavery, which had the great economic disadvantage of requiring continuing owner responsibility. It frees Byrd for his larger efforts in Washington to keep expenses down and the budget balanced.

T.R.B.

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Dulles Is Wrong

SECRETARY DULLES asks us to "refuse to be discouraged" by the news from the Formosa Strait. We refuse to take heart, for we consider the Administration's Quemoy policy indefensible morally, militarily and politically.

It is morally indefensible because it is not supported by "the common conscience of mankind," or whatever it is that gives rise to that international consensus without which moral (or legal) principles in international relations have no standing. No amount of harping by the Secretary upon the virtues of "world order" will hide the fact that in this case the "world" does not regard US policy as consonant with "order."

The President and his Secretary of State charge the Chinese Communists with military "aggression" for the purpose of adding the offshore islands to their territory. "Aggression," however, is a semantic trap; both the old League of Nations and the UN have tried and failed to define it. Whether a specific national act is "aggressive" depends upon the circumstances, *as interpreted by the nations in the light of conscience and interest.* There was wide agreement in the non-Communist world that the North Korean attack of 1950 constituted "aggression," and it was on that consensus that we were enabled to act as an agent of the UN. In the case of the offshore islands there is no such consensus, for the obvious reason that most nations, including our senior partners in NATO, regard these islands as pawns in a civil war.

The Charter of the United Nations is built upon at least two main principles. One is that the status quo *between* nations must not be altered by violent means. It is this to which Mr. Dulles makes his appeal when he mentions "world order." The other principle is that the UN shall not "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." Mr. Dulles' effort to convert the Western bloc in the United Nations into a vigilance committee to enforce his concepts upon the domestic affairs of other nations are blocked by this second principle.

The Quemoy policy is militarily indefensible simply because our country lacks the means to impose it upon Communist China at a cost acceptable either to our people or to the world at large. As we said two weeks ago, when the Formosa Strait policy was in process of formulation early in 1955 it was evident that it could only be maintained by military force. At that time, however, we had the military force to maintain it. But the basic equation of force has since changed. Our policies *can* be challenged today, where they could not have been then except by an opponent bent on suicide. Today, with Chinese military forces armed with Russian jet planes and other modern military equipment and backed by Russian nuclear bombs opposing our forces and the forces of Chiang Kai-shek in Amoy Bay, we must re-estimate the cost of a policy of defending these islands. It has become decidedly questionable whether we could "win" such an action without employing nuclear weapons—such are the depths of "conventional" weakness to which the "bigger bang for a buck" concept has reduced our

Correspondence

► *Schlesinger Replies to His Critics*

SIRS:

The New Republic has invited me to respond to the comments made in the issue of September 29 on my article in the issue of September 15.

The comments fall into two categories. One is a defense of individual candi-

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military forces. And if we use these weapons, we must at once add to the cost of the operation—and of our Quemoy policy—not only the onus of initiating the first nuclear war, but also the very special offense of doing so against Asiatics. And we must also add the incalculable cost of American lives that will be spent if the nuclear "defense" of Quemoy cannot be limited.

Finally, the Quemoy policy is politically indefensible. As our commitment to the United Nations in its present form is something less than total, policies that are not sanctioned by the UN are perhaps not always inexpedient. But if these policies lack UN sanction, they must at least be defensible upon some basis that merits general support by our own citizens. Such a basis might be some concept of "world order" that includes, even if it transcends, UN principles as they presently can be applied. But if it is to be persuasive, such a concept cannot be confined—as Mr. Dulles has been confining it—to the sole dogma that change in the world must "not involve surrender to force or the threat of force," for this rule makes us an intruder in every national household on the globe, and the world's policeman as well. Our vision of the kind of world we can live in must be realizable as well as desirable. It must have regard to the limits of our power as well as to the purity of our motives. Above all, it must be a totality, in which things said and done in Washington to affect the course of events in the Formosa Strait are compatible with what we hope to accomplish—or preserve—elsewhere.

Given, then, the absence of an international consensus to sanction our Quemoy policy, and our lack of the means to impose it at a cost acceptable even in the name of some higher concept of order, that policy cannot but collapse. And the tragedy is that its fall may well bring down with it our last chance to sustain an independent non-Communist Formosa.

NEXT WEEK

Two Views of the Quemoy Crisis

JOHN K. FAIRBANK, director of Harvard University's program of Chinese Economic and Political Studies and the author of *The United States and China,* comments on the article in this issue by Michael Lindsay.

DENIS HEALEY, one of the British Labour Party's leading foreign policy spokesmen, writes on *Formosa and the Western Alliance.*

Chiang's Future

WHATEVER HOPE remains, short of war, for preserving a non-Communist Formosa rests on finding some common ground between the United States and such friendly—and concerned—powers as Britain and Japan. But such a common front presupposes our government's willingness to reconsider its obligations to Chiang.

We have certainly not been ungenerous in the support we have given the Nationalist Chinese since their departure from the mainland—$2.2 billion, to mention only money. Now no amount of money can restore Chiang's power on the mainland, and there is very grave doubt whether his authority can be maintained on Formosa without a realistic redefinition of what he is and what he is not.

The governing fact in the present situation is that the Chinese Communists probably want, as the price of peace, Chiang's Security Council seat—and are now in a position to get a UN Assembly majority next year or at the very latest the year after. Our objective between now and the next UN session, therefore, should be to prevent Peking's winning UN membership in such a way that Chiang is thrown out of the UN and Washington is in the lonely possession of the fiction that Chiang is China. If this is not to happen, our government must work out with our allies a policy which redefines, at least implicitly, the Republic of China's sovereignty as being limited to Formosa and the Pescadores—and which insists on a UN Assembly seat for the Republic of China as part of any UN admission for Communist China.

This is the "two Chinas" proposal, which at this moment neither Peking nor Taipeh will underwrite, but which is still the best proposal for the US to advance—if in doing so our government can obtain broad acceptance for Chiang's newly-limited sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores. The situation then obtaining would amount to a planned impasse: Chiang's claim to a Security Council seat would become open to question at a time when Chiang would be scorning any thought of demotion to an Assembly seat. Peking, on the other hand, would probably decline UN entry so long as it involved even an Assembly seat for Chiang. But such an impasse would have one saving virtue: the US would not stand alone, and, to the extent that a broad international consensus accepting Chiang's authority in Formosa did emerge, the chances would increase that Peking or Taipeh would sooner or later yield ground. An important aspect of such a consensus would be the avoidance of any formal legal delimitation of the Republic of China's sovereignty which would imply that Formosa is not a part of China and that Peking must thus renounce its territorial claims.

A new US-China policy which looks to Peking's mem-

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bership in the Security Council and a seat for Chiang—as Formosa—in the Assembly would represent an uneasy perpetuation of the status quo. It would "solve" nothing—but it would buy time and it would avert war.

De Gaulle's Victory

IN A COUNTRY with a long history of successful plebiscites, nothing quite like Charles de Gaulle's victory has ever taken place. It is true that Napoleon III won in 1870 by a larger margin (7,358,786 to 1,571,939), but that election, in common with all the other plebiscites up to de Gaulle's, was not free. There will now be a parliamentary election in November. Despite the constitutional limitations on the power of the legislature, the membership of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate will be of importance because de Gaulle, who is certain to move from the premiership to the new and all-powerful Presidency, is the kind of man who likes to leave nearly all the detail to subordinates.

Then it will be seen what direction the General takes in Algeria, that is, how he will use the army. He has always attributed to it a large role in national politics. In 1934 he wrote:

> If national reform should have to begin by the army, there would be nothing in that fact out of line with the natural order of things . . . for the reason that the military corps is the most complete expression of the spirit of a society . . . Rome can best be understood by the history of its legions . . . in the hard work which will rejuvenate France, the new army will serve as resource and leaven, because the sword is the axis of the world, and grandeur is indivisible.

But, as Hubert Beuve-Mery, the editor of *Le Monde*, has pointed out, no one is better placed than de Gaulle, "if he wants to," to make the army understand that its true victory in Algeria cannot be obtained by a war "without mercy and without end." The outcome of the next phase of French history will rest on whether de Gaulle can quickly shift the focus of power from Algiers back to Paris, and whether such power can speak the language of conciliation and peace.

Run Against Reuther

IT WAS LONG ago discovered that when a campaign isn't going well, it's advisable to run against someone other than your opponent. Walter Reuther seems to be the GOP's favorite "someone other." While Senator Knowland's wife was sending for those 10,000 copies of Joseph Kamp's leaflets ("Meet the Man Who Plans to Rule America"), some well-heeled eastern Republicans were doing their bit by paying for a full-page ad in the *Wall Street Journal* ("Will You Let Walter Reuther Get Away With It?").

The *Journal* ad was produced by Edward Rumely's Committee for Constitutional Government. According to the copy, Walter Reuther "is a third-generation Socialist." It alleges also that in 1933, while working in a Moscow factory, *Victor* Reuther wrote a letter to an American friend which contained the sentence: "Carry on the fight for a Soviet America." This same allegation appears in a fund-raising letter mailed subsequently by Rumely to a large number of Republican and Democratic campaign contributors. Rumely's appeal is for money with which to give the *Journal* ad wider circulation. He points out that it could be placed in 109 California newspapers for only $48,000. He adds that a mat of the ad has been sent to "every newspaper in the states of California, Arizona, Kansas, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin"—and that "many publishers of newspapers may be willing to have their advertising solicitors give their help in finding financial support to pay for the ad."

What concerns us is not the allegation made about Victor Reuther. That is answered by his proved dedication to honest, democratic leadership of trade unions and by the successful fight the Reuthers have made to free the UAW and CIO of Communist infiltration. What concerns us is the willingness of important Republicans to throw up this sort of poisonous smokescreen. The contrary to what Rumely says is true: Walter Reuther *ought* to have but doesn't have the kind of influence on the Democratic Party attributed to him by this propaganda.

Campaign Issues

AS THE CONGRESSIONAL campaign grows hotter, Democrats will be heaping coals on the heads of Republicans for having been delinquent in fighting the recession. And it is proper that they do so. Admittedly, recessions are bipartisan: we suffered reversals in 1947, 1949, not to mention 1937, as well as in 1953 and 1958. Granted also that in an economy which enjoys a wide margin of optional spending both by consumers and by investors, fluctuations are almost inevitable. Nonetheless, the voter is entitled to evaluate the promptness and adequacy of each party's response to economic adversity.

The Republican record is poor. Initially, the President denied the recession's existence; he persisted in ignoring the harsh effects of a tight money policy; he next tried to talk the recession away; and finally he grudgingly consented to a modest extension of unemployment compensation. The consequences are still with us, and any Republican candidate who tries to brush the recession under the carpet either can't count or doesn't care. Five million are still out of work.

As a party, the Democrats did somewhat better. Lyndon Johnson quite early in the session sponsored a

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legislative package which included an emergency housing bill, an emergency highway bill, and a $2 billion program for improving local community facilities. But Johnson and Rayburn were also responsible for the treaty with their fellow Texan, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, which halted consideration of tax reduction—by all odds the most promising anti-recession device available and one recommended by the only professor of economics in the Senate, Paul Douglas. Moreover, Johnson and Rayburn were either unwilling or unable to hold their Southern colleagues in line for the much more generous extension of unemployment compensation urged by Senator Kennedy.

There was no sign that the Democratic Congressional leadership glimpsed in the recession an opportunity to combine social advancement with recovery in the classic liberal mixture. The alternatives were, save in rare exceptions, not liberal and conservative programs, but reactionary and moderately conservative programs. That is why the '58 campaign has such importance. For there is a real chance that the liberal Congress which may come into being as a result of heavy Democratic gains will be far less constrained and will use its mandate to promote the resumption of vigorous economic growth and the correction of social inequities. On the first score, it will have to choose between further aid to business in the form of tax and depreciation benefits (as proposed by Mr. Nixon), or larger investment in what Kenneth Galbraith has called the social overhead. A Congress with a liberal working majority will, in other words, be interested in the quality of economic growth as much as in its quantity. Concretely, it will invest more heavily in public aid to education, in a public housing program designed less to please banks and insurance companies and more to benefit tenants, and in substantial grants or loans to communities for the improvement of public facilities.

Welcome Home

As TRB REPORTS this week, the old Nixon's back in town. We missed him. We never were at ease with that new fellow with his talk about civil rights and freedom for colonial peoples. It's grand having him speak out in the old way, warning us that some subordinate in the State Department is deliberately trying to "sabotage" our Far East policy. He knows and we know that it isn't true (Mr. Dulles is perfectly competent to do it without any assistance), but that's what makes the charge so arresting. And it also clears up the question of what platform the Vice President is relying on to support him for the next two years. Peace, prosperity and integrity in government aren't what they used to be.

How Will the Corn Belt Farmers Vote?

Some Guesses by the Research Director of "Wallace's Farmer"

DO CORN BELT farmers love Secretary Benson today—*even though many of them hated him a year ago?* How popular is President Eisenhower on corn belt farms right now? And how much help will Ike's popularity give Republican candidates among farmers this year? These questions will not be answered fully until after November 4. But there are some useful indicators from farm surveys conducted in Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota.

Secretary Benson's popularity has been measured regularly by *Wallace's Farmer* in Iowa, by *Wisconsin Agriculturist* in Wisconsin, and by the *Minneapolis Tribune* in Minnesota.

Minnesota farmers, interviewed by the *Minneapolis Tribune,* find 54 percent of farm people showing "strong disapproval" of Benson. And 20 percent more show "mild disapproval."

Farm people in Iowa, asked whether Secretary Benson was doing a good, fair or poor job, voted 53 percent "poor" a year ago and 50 percent "poor" this summer.

Wisconsin farmers show more dramatically how little substance there is in the claim that Benson's popularity is on the up-grade out in the country. Here is the Wisconsin farm vote on Benson a year ago and this August:

	1957 Percent	*1958 Percent*
Good	4	5
Fair	24	18
Poor	54	63
Undecided	18	14

Some city people are surprised at reports like this, for they have often been told that Benson is regarded as a dedicated and skillful administrator. Why do so many farmers feel differently?

A standard farm answer is this: Under Benson, surpluses have increased, federal farm programs have grown more costly and farm income has gone down. Speaking

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to this last point, a farmer who is also an official of an Illinois marketing association, had this comment:

> I agree with most of the things Benson has done, but I do wish he would quit lying. Look at his claim that per capita farm income has increased. He knows very well—and so does every farmer—that per capita income from farming has gone down. Low farm income has forced a lot of farmers into taking part-time jobs in town. It's this off-farm income that has gone up.

But though Benson is disliked by two-thirds of Wisconsin farmers and by half of Iowa and Minnesota farmers, what political significance does this fact have? In 1956, Benson was unpopular too. But Ike carried the farm districts of Iowa and Wisconsin anyway. His margin was cut down, compared to 1952, but he still got 55 percent of the farm vote in Wisconsin and 53 percent of the farm vote in Iowa. What influence does farm sentiment on Benson have on voting habits this year? Take the Iowa farmers who say Benson is doing a "poor job." How are they planning to vote for US Representatives in Congress?

"Poor job" Benson (Iowa)

Republican candidates	22 percent
Democratic candidates	65 percent
Undecided	13 percent

Apparently Benson is a distinct handicap to Republican Congressional candidates in Iowa, and nobody knows this better than the GOP candidates themselves. In 1956, when Benson came to Iowa, the Republican candidates scattered like chickens under the shadow of a hawk. All but one had important engagements elsewhere in the state.

What about Benson's prestige in Wisconsin? Take the farm people who say Benson is doing a "poor job" and see how they vote:

"Poor job" Benson (Wisconsin)

Steinle (Rep.)	15 percent
Proxmire (Dem.)	63 percent
Undecided	18 percent

In Minnesota, the farm vote leans toward Democratic-Farmer-Labor Congressmen. Even with Republican Senator Thye's anti-Benson record, he still is running no better than even with his Democratic opponent.

Dairymen in Wisconsin and Minnesota seem especially exasperated with Benson and particularly likely to vote Democratic. In Wisconsin, dairymen give Proxmire (D) a big majority, but Steinle (R) is slightly ahead among farmers who are not dairymen.

It seems clear that among corn belt farmers, Benson is a Democratic asset. He was that also in 1956, but then a feeling that Ike was their man for maintaining peace made many a farmer vote Republican even though he detested Benson and Administration farm policies. Today, "preventing war" is still the big issue for farmers. It outranks "raising farm income." And farmers still have hope that Eisenhower will keep the US out of trouble. But they aren't so sure.

Will farmers who voted for Eisenhower in 1956 vote for Republican candidates for Congress this year? Following is the way Iowa farmers now say they'll vote this fall on candidates for the House of Representatives.

	Ike Voters Percent	*Stevenson Voters Percent*
Republican candidates	59	9
Democratic candidates	24	84
Undecided	17	7

Note that 24 percent of Ike's voters deserted the Republican Congressional candidates, while only 9 percent of Stevenson's voters deserted the Democratic candidates.

Wisconsin shows the same trends. Stevenson farmer voters are sticking to the Democratic candidates. There are heavy desertions among Ike voters. One farmer in St. Croix County, Wisconsin, explained his shift to the Democrats in this way: "I have always voted for the Republican Party. But this year, I'm going to vote for the other side, because I think the Republicans have forgotten all about the little man and the farmers who really need some help."

The situation can be put this way: In Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota, Benson's unpopularity is worth more to the Democrats than Eisenhower's waning popularity is to the Republicans.

Of course, changes may come by election time. Hog prices may drop in Iowa—and that would help the Democrats. The Formosa affair may alarm some farmers and make them decide the GOP is not the party of peace. On the other hand, our foreign affairs might take a turn that will help the Republicans. In 1956, the Suez affair swung farm votes to the Republicans in the last few weeks.

But as matters now stand among corn belt farmers, it seems likely that the Democrats will be stronger than in 1956. In Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa and Missouri, Democratic candidates will probably carry the farm districts. But not the small towns. The towns stay Republican through thick and thin. Democratic strength on farms will increase in Illinois and Indiana, although not to the degree found in the Western corn belt.

What all this suggests of Senators and Representatives actually elected is harder to say. Even in so-called "farm states," farmers are a minority. In Iowa in 1956, for example, although farmers gave 54 percent of their votes to Democratic candidates for Congress, they elected only one Democratic Congressman.

DONALD R. MURPHY

Des Moines

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Formosa's Future

by MICHAEL LINDSAY

BEFORE DISCUSSING the future of Formosa one needs to say a good deal about the background and especially the recent background because a good deal of the current controversy is distorted by misconceptions about it.

The non-Chinese aborigines who occupied most of the island in the 17th Century now only survive as separate tribal groups in the mountain areas and only number some 100,000. The great majority of the population in 1945, some six million, was composed of the descendants of Chinese immigrants, mostly from the adjoining mainland province of Fukien, and close mainland contacts were kept up until the early years of this century.

From 1895 to 1945 Formosa was a Japanese colony. The Japanese constructed a good railway system, developed irrigation works and hydroelectric power, built up a large sugar industry, and started fairly general education at the elementary level. The local inhabitants had only limited opportunities for higher education or for rising very high in government or managerial positions but, in other respects, were probably better off than the people in many areas of the mainland under warlord rule. Formosa customs were similar to those surviving in more remote mountain areas of the mainland. Formosa dialect uses many phrases which were current on the mainland a century ago, and people tended to use Japanese words for technical terms rather than the new Chinese ones.

Between 1945 and 1950 nearly 2 million people moved into Formosa from the mainland, first as officials and technicians and then, in much larger numbers, as refugees. With this immigration and a rapid rate of natural increase, the population is now about 10 million.

In the years after 1945, Formosa was very badly governed and resentment against the new rulers from the mainland culminated in the revolt of 1947 which was very brutally suppressed. This misgovernment and the dislike of the newcomers from the mainland was the basis of Formosan desire for independence. Up to a few years ago many foreign observers considered that, if the Formosans had been able to express their preferences in a free election, the order of choice would have been: (1) independence, (2) return to Japan, (3) continuance of Kuomintang rule, and (4) unification with the mainland under Communism. It was this situation which formed the basis of suggestions for a "two Chinas" solution of the Formosan problem and for the widely held view of the Kuomintang regime on Formosa as a corrupt and unpopular dictatorship which would probably collapse internally with the death of Chiang Kai-shek or the withdrawal of American support.

It is quite possible that a solution which left Formosa as an independent state under UN protection would have secured majority support in Formosa some years ago, but much of today's discussion of the Formosa problem ignores the changes which have been taking place during the past nine years. Today, it is quite likely that a UN supervised election on Formosa would do nothing at all to produce a settlement, because the present government would very likely win the election. Let me explain why I think this is so.

The move to Formosa in 1949 produced considerable changes in the Kuomintang regime. At the time, the move was a risky gamble. It was not at all certain that Formosa could be defended against Communist attack or that American support would be forthcoming. Many of the more self-seeking leaders in the Kuomintang preferred the safety of exile abroad. Those who did move to Formosa realized that their only hope lay in turning it into a model province in which the regime had popular support and which could exert a power of attraction on the mainland. Many people on the island now say, "If only we had put through on the mainland the policies we have now carried out on Formosa, the Communists would never have won." And this is almost certainly true.

As Governor of Formosa, Chen Cheng, the present Prime Minister, started with a drastic clean up of administration and restoration of army discipline. A land reform with the aim of producing a society of peasants owning their own farms began with the limitation of rents and went on to the compulsory sale of larger holdings. This was combined with the encouragement of cooperative organization and programs of technical advice and assistance in which the Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction played a large part. The results have been very successful. Rice production, for example, which had reached 1.4 million tons in 1938 but was under 900,000 tons in 1946 was up to 1.8 million tons in 1957.

Large-scale industrial projects, such as fertilizer plants

LORD LINDSAY OF BIRKER *recently spent six months on Formosa. In 1954 he accompanied the Attlee mission to Communist China as interpreter. He is Acting Head of the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University and is currently lecturing at Yale University.*

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or hydroelectric schemes, depend heavily on American aid, but there has also been a rapid growth of textile manufacture and light industry. Locally-produced bicycles can now be bought for the equivalent of US $25.

At the elementary-school level, education is now almost universal and there has been a big expansion in middle schools and universities. This education program has been very successful in producing a general knowledge of standard Chinese.

Public finance is distorted by the very high military expenditure which takes 10 percent of the national income and 50 percent of all taxation. The overall effect on the economy is balanced by US aid, but the shortage of finance affects needed programs. The armed forces are among the strongest in non-Communist Asia and, while the officer corps still consists very largely of Mainlanders, a high and increasing proportion of the soldiers are Formosans.

Local government is now run by elected councils and mayors up to an elected provincial assembly. And the Kuomintang has been very successful in building a local organization. In the local council elections in January this year, which were contested between Kuomintang and independents, a very high proportion of the Kuomintang candidates were natives of Formosa.

In thinking of the future of Formosa one must, therefore, start from a picture of the situation very different from that of nine years ago. Excluding Japan, Formosa may quite well be the best administered country in Asia. Corruption still exists and will be hard to eliminate so long as the public service is so badly paid, but here again Formosa could probably compare favorably with most other Asian countries.

Industrialization may not be as rapid as on the mainland but neither has it involved the same forced austerity. Articles in the Peking press gave figures for average per-capita annual income among the peasant population on the mainland in 1956 varying from US $20 to US $25. Statistics prepared by the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction for the same period gave an average figure on Formosa of US $43, with a similar price level and without the rationing of such essential commodities as cloth, which in some parts of the mainland was restricted to 4 yards per person per year.

The Central Government of Formosa is still run almost entirely by Mainlanders. (Mainlanders argue that any educated Formosan prefers to go into business where he can make a far larger income than in the public service.) However, bad feeling between Mainlanders and Formosans is diminishing and people in universities say that it has practically disappeared when one gets down to the university-student age group.

Government powers involve considerable restriction of civil liberties, but there is nothing like the police state atmosphere of the mainland. People seem quite ready to express their own opinions in private conversation. And there is quite a lot of serious criticism of the government even in the press. Much official publicity and some official action suggests a tendency to think in terms of the old ideal of an authoritarian paternalistic system. On the other hand, the tendency in favor of freedom and democracy is obviously more powerful than it was on the mainland.

If people acted only from economic motives, this progress on Formosa would make its inhabitants more ready to accept an independent status. They have a higher per capita national income than the mainland, and the economy would be viable without large-scale American assistance if military expenditure could be reduced to a normal peace-time level. In the long run the standard of living would decline if the present population increase of 3.5 percent a year continues, but union with the almost equally overcrowded mainland would do little to solve this problem.

In fact, however, an independent Formosa has become less and not more acceptable. Even Japanese informants admit that the Formosa Independence Movement which functions in Tokyo has become weaker. The whole emphasis of the education system is on the Chinese character of Formosa society, and this has certainly influenced the younger generation. A public-opinion poll would probably show a considerable majority in favor of the view that Formosa ought to be part of China, with some dissenting minority among the older Formosans. However, it is certain that a majority of more than 90 percent would say that Formosa should not be united with the mainland under the present Communist regime.

It is true that what people want does not mean much unless one also knows how far they would go to get it. Here opinion is harder to estimate. Many of the older Mainlanders would probably be willing to go very far to obtain unification under a non-Communist regime; quite a high proportion still have part of their families on the mainland. The Formosans and the Mainlanders who came over as children probably do not feel so strongly about re-unification and, in the course of time, as power passes into the hands of the younger generation, an independent status for Formosa might be accepted in practice. People would still say that Formosa really ought to be part of China but would not be prepared to do very much about it, while they would be prepared to fight to prevent the island coming under Communist rule.

The view that Formosa ought to be part of China, in fact that it *is* part of China, is equally strongly held in Peking and probably by a majority of politically conscious opinion on the mainland. One obvious motive for this feeling is simple nationalism. Formosa has historically been part of China and under effective Chinese adminis-

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tration from the 17th Century till 1895 and its population is Chinese.

What is not clear is why Peking should have chosen this moment for pressing its claims. Demands for the return of Formosa have figured prominently in Peking publicity for the past four years or more but, until this August, the Peking authorities have been willing to confine themselves largely to words. One possible motive is a realization that the chances of obtaining Formosa by subversion have become small. In the period from 1954 to 1957, when there was a general liberalization of the Peking regime, there may have been some real chances of subversion. Life under Communist rule seemed to be becoming more tolerable and the military and political leaders who had gone over to the Communists during the civil war and had been rewarded with new official positions seemed to have some degree of independence. In 1956 some foreign observers considered that the greatest danger to the Formosan regime was that some people in the Kuomintang organization might be tempted by Communist offers of liberal rewards if they staged a *coup d' etat* and brought over Formosa. But the "anti-rightist" campaign on the mainland destroyed these chances of subversion. Those non-Communist figures who had shown any signs of independence were attacked and it became clear that anyone who went over to the Communists would have to accept complete subservience to the Communist Party. Even those Mainlanders who badly wanted to get back to their homes realized that they had far greater freedom and security on Formosa than they could hope for on the mainland. Communist realization that the chance of taking over the island by subversion had disappeared would explain the Communist shift to military pressure. And the construction of airfields and strategic railways on the mainland coast showed that the possibility of military action had always been considered.

Another more speculative possibility which could explain current Communist maneuvers is that the Peking authorities were becoming afraid of Formosa. The developments of 1957 suggested that Mao Tse-tung had seriously misjudged opinion on the mainland and had thought that Communist rule was generally accepted so that greater freedom of criticism would only produce the kind of mild criticism which the regime could accept. In fact, the period of comparative freedom showed that the regime faced very strong opposition, not only from the older intellectuals who had started their careers under the former regime, but also from university students who had only been children when the Communists came to power. In some universities more than half the students were expelled when the period of comparative freedom was replaced by the "anti-rightist" campaign. In this situation an alternative Chinese regime showing that it was possible to have quite rapid economic progress without forced austerity and with a much greater degree of freedom could exert a real power of attraction on the mainland. And the increasing proportion of Overseas Chinese students going to Formosa rather than to the mainland showed that Formosa was competing effectively in a field to which both sides attach great importance.

A still more speculative extension of this possibility is that the Peking authorities are afraid of a possible peasant revolt. There is a lot of evidence of dissatisfaction in the countryside. One of the common criticisms in 1957 was that the Communists had done very little for the peasants and analysis of figures issued in Peking shows that living standards in the countryside are low and may even have been falling. There is certainly a wide gap between peasants and city workers and numerous articles in the Peking papers have discussed measures to prevent and reverse the flow into the cities of people in search of better conditions. Direct reports are scarce because the Peking authorities have been unwilling to allow foreign visitors or correspondents to see the countryside, but people in Hong Kong in contact with relatives on the mainland say that conditions in Kuangtung are very bad. Traditionally the Chinese peasant has been prepared to put up with a great deal and then suddenly turn against his oppressors even when the chances of successful revolt are very small. Whether or not the peasants in some areas of the mainland are near the point which they would consider intolerable is almost impossible to estimate.

If, however, the Peking authorities considered that there was a real risk that some areas of the countryside might soon approach the point of revolt it would explain their urgency in trying to eliminate Formosa. A revolt with assistance from Formosa would be a vastly greater danger than a purely internal revolt, and the Communists might well consider that it was worth taking considerable risks to eliminate the island before it was too late.

THE future of Formosa is full of "might have beens." If the island had been put under UN trusteeship after 1945 it might now have become a fairly successful small state which Peking would only have wanted to attack from nationalist motives and could only have attacked at the expense of alienating neutralist Asian opinion. If Mao Tse-tung in 1957 had chosen to base his power on popular support and had purged the Stalinist wing of his party, a revisionist Communist regime might have won Formosa by peaceful subversion. The actual future is extremely uncertain and the main conclusion which seems to follow from the preceding analysis is that most of the suggested solutions are unlikely to work.

It is possible that the United States could apply enough pressure in Taipeh to obtain the acceptance of some scheme for a UN supervised plebiscite, though this might involve landing US troops to apply pressure. But Peking has repeatedly declared that it would not accept any such scheme. And what would happen in the very likely event

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that a plebiscite ratified the present government's pledge to unify Formosa with the mainland under a non-Communist regime?

Neutralization of Formosa might be possible and would remove any real basis for Communist fears of an actual attack on the mainland. It would not, however, remove the psychological effect on the mainland of an alternative Chinese regime and, if a revolt did start on the mainland, the US would find itself in the position of assisting the Communists to suppress a revolt by preventing assistance from reaching it.

Probably the least dangerous situation which could be hoped for would be a return to the uneasy balance which existed up to August this year, with neither side wanting to start large-scale hostilities. But here again it is doubtful whether Peking would be willing to go back to this situation even if it had been able to make small-scale gains by occupying the off-shore islands.

The off-shore islands are rather a different problem. There is a clear difference in the legal position. When this question was debated in the British press some two years ago, most of the international lawyers seemed to agree that, while Japan had renounced sovereignty over Formosa, it had not been clearly given to anyone else. The off-shore islands, however, are part of Fukien province and the legal claim of the Taipeh government to them depends on its claim to be the government of China. Countries which recognize Taipeh have a good case for supporting this claim while countries which recognize Peking do not.

If Peking is only aiming at the control of the off-shore islands, there would be obvious advantages in finding some way of withdrawing from a position which is militarily hard to defend and which provides an issue on which the United States Government has little support in the international community. The policy of "keeping the Communists guessing" about the US position over the islands was an invitation to trouble, and the invitation has been accepted. It would have made sense to say that the islands were militarily indefensible and that the Taipeh government could not expect American assistance in defending them. It might also have made sense to extend the US defense treaty with Formosa to cover the islands, which would have made a Communist attack unlikely unless the Peking regime actually wanted a war with the United States.

Now, there are two difficulties in negotiating a withdrawal from Quemoy and Matsu. The first comes from Peking. As several commentators have pointed out, the Peking case would have been considerably stronger if the Communists had confined their immediate claims to the off-shore islands. By bringing in more general demands for US withdrawal from the whole Formosa area they strengthen the grounds for believing that the attack on Quemoy is merely the preliminary to an attack on Formosa itself. The US has a clear treaty obligation to defend Formosa and, if the attack on Quemoy is merely the preliminary to an attack on Formosa, there are obvious disadvantages in abandoning a forward position without fighting for it.

The second is an issue which has figured very little in the discussion—the position of the civilian inhabitants of the off-shore islands of whom nearly 45,000 live on the Quemoy group and about 20,000 on the Matsu group. These people have greatly improved their conditions under the agrarian reform programs and it is fairly certain that they would not want to come under Communist rule. It may not be worth while having a war over the fate of 65,000 people, but the issue could be effectively used in psychological warfare. An obvious proposal in any negotiations would be for a plebiscite on Quemoy and Matsu: This would not involve any real loss of prestige for the Taipeh government, for it could say, "We are sure that these people would prefer to remain under our rule and to prove it we would be prepared to allow a UN supervised plebiscite." It is practically certain that any such proposal would be rejected by Peking but simply by making the proposal the US and the Formosa Government would show that withdrawal from the islands was not simply an abandonment of an untenable military position, but that the Chinese Communists were using military force to establish their authority in areas where the local population did not want them. This would strengthen the case for making a really firm defense of defensible positions on Formosa and the Pescadores and increase the support which could be obtained from world opinion for such a defense.

THE general conclusions which emerge from this argument leave the future very uncertain. If Peking is only pursuing limited objectives in the off-shore islands, an immediate settlement should be possible. Even a withdrawal without compensating concessions from Peking (leaving it clear that this was against the inhabitants' wishes) would involve a loss of prestige for Peking. If, on the other hand, Peking is really determined to eliminate the Formosan regime even at the expense of a war then it is hard to see how war can be avoided. The only hope would be that, like the Korean War, it might be kept local. However, if Peking is determined on the immediate elimination of Formosa this is probably a sign of internal weakness rather than of strength.

Even if the immediate crisis is dealt with peacefully, it seems to me likely that Formosa will remain a potential danger point for some time to come. A peaceful long-term solution could only be reached after both Chinese regimes had gradually come to realize that they had no hope of eliminating the other, or through a changed regime in Peking whose rule would seem attractive to people on Formosa.

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Osborn ON BRINKMANSHIP AT QUEMOY



On Going to the Brink

"... On the question of Formosa ... we walked to the brink and we looked it in the face. We took strong action. It took a lot more courage for the President than for me. His was the ultimate decision. I did not have to make the decision myself, only to recommend it. The President never flinched for a moment on any of these situations. He always came up taut."

SECRETARY DULLES—*January 16, 1956*

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

On Going It Alone

"There cannot be an adequate discharge of our responsibilities if, in an area like this [the Formosa Straits], where we have the force, where others do not, that we just say we will not do anything unless all of some 45 allies agree with us."

SECRETARY DULLES—*September 9, 1958*

On Going to the UN

"Most members look upon the UN as a means of promoting world order, and they are willing to adapt their national policies to this great goal. But there are a potent few who participate in the UN only as it gives them an opportunity for maneuvers which will advance their own narrow nationalistic purposes . . . The US believes that this double standard is incompatible with the basic purposes of our Organization."

SECRETARY DULLES *to the UN*
—September 18, 1958

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NOVEMBER ELECTION

New Faces

BOWLES

SUPPOSE this *is* a Democratic year, what difference would it make on Capitol Hill?

FROM AMONG the many new Democratic (and Republican) candidates, we have selected a small number of newcomers whose presence in Congress would, we think, add considerable weight to a liberal point of view. To narrow the field to possible winners, we have restricted our choice to "marginal" districts and districts in which the incumbent is not seeking re-election.

THIS IS the second of six reports.

CHESTER BOWLES took an astonishing political step when he agreed to run for Congress after having lost the nomination for Senator at the August Connecticut Democratic Convention. In asking him to do so Governor Abraham Ribicoff and party boss John Bailey were obviously making a gesture of sorts to Bowles supporters; they were also aware that a characteristically vigorous Bowles campaign would give a fillip to the whole Democratic ticket in the eastern half of Connecticut which comprises the Second District.

Bowles, for his part, had to decide whether a former Price Administrator, Ambassador, Governor, Presidential possibility should risk his reputation in a campaign for a small office. Perhaps his decision was influenced by the precedent of John Quincy Adams, who served eight terms in the House after leaving the Presidency. As a member of the House, Bowles would in all probability be given a place on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and this, he may reason, offers him a better platform and more influence on foreign policy than he would have as a private lecturer and writer. For those who believe that Bowles, of all people, should indeed be where he can influence policy, his willingness to take something less than half a loaf only adds to his stature. And it might even be good politics—if the voters admire him for his modesty—and if he wins.

On the basis of the record, Bowles has to run scared. The Second District has elected Democratic Congressmen only four times since it was created in 1914—1936, 1940, 1944 and 1948—all Democratic landslide years. Never has it gone Democratic in an off-year. The Republican incumbent, Rep. Seely-Brown, has won five of the last six Congressional elections in the Second (he lost in 1948 to Mrs. Chase Going Woodhouse). The district is "swamp Yankee" country with 64 of Connecticut's 169 towns, only three of them sizable ones—Norwich, New London and Middletown—each with a population of about 30,000. No single TV station reaches enough of the area to simplify campaigning.

Whether Seely-Brown's low-key personality is a liability or an asset in the necessarily personalized vote-getting of the Second remains an open question. He's never really been tested. Pleasant, "maybe even handsome in a way," as one district observer puts it, Seely-Brown is a tall and butch-haircutted former prep-school biology teacher, owner of apple and peach orchards, who conscientiously attends almost all House sessions, but has sponsored almost no legislation in ten years. Only one issue has inspired any ringing affirmations; Seely-Brown is among the pleaders for a strong submarine service, a fact not unrelated to the presence in New London of the Electric Boat Company, maker of the Nautilus and other atomic subs. His strength is simply that he's been in Congress long enough to become known on every courthouse step and in every sheriff's office. His standard campaign gimmick for years has been a house-to-house visitation with his wife to distribute pot-holders emblazoned with his name in a delicate brown.

Bowles has concentrated on the coffee-and-doughnuts circuit—the pace was 33 sittings per day at the last count ("I'm getting so I can't look a brownie in the face; last week I gained five pounds and the coffee is keeping me awake at night.") Neither candidate mentions the other, and Bowles seeks to do Seely-Brown one better only in the matter of service to his district: he pledges to open a full-time office in the district, compared to Seely-Brown's intermittent "roving office hours"; and he emphasizes the industrial revitalization of the district to obviate any suggestions that, while he may be interested in India, he isn't concerned with eastern Connecticut.

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BROWN



COHELAN



KARTH

TOLL

RUDD BROWN is almost too good to be true: granddaughter of William Jennings Bryan and the daughter of a Congresswoman; a "feminine" woman candidate who doesn't antagonize women; an atomic scientist's wife who can talk to (not down to) indifferent citizens.

In her first try for any public office she is challenging a three-term Congressman who votes isolationist and crusades to get the US back on the gold standard. The Republican suburbs of northern Los Angeles County seem not to mind their far-right maverick, retired mail-order executive Edgar Hiestand, and his margins have increased with each of his victories. But in the 21st District's population of nearly 400,000 there are also enough middling suburbs with newly-settled aircraft workers to mark it for some future date as "normally Democratic."

Few new Congressmen have special areas of competence—and couldn't wangle the right committee assignments if they did. Mrs. Brown and her interest in education and foreign affairs (especially nuclear weapons policy) are familiar to many members of Congress: some have heard committee testimony by her distinguished husband, Harrison Brown; others remember her mother, Rep. Ruth Bryan Owen Rohde of Florida. When Mrs. Brown attended the bipartisan rally for the Reciprocal Trade Bill last spring in Washington, Sam Rayburn did a double-take in the Statler lobby and, insisting that this handsome 37-year-old woman "can't be little Helen Rohde," gave her a big hug and kiss. If she doesn't make the Education Committee, in short, the reason won't be indifference by the House leadership but the fact that others are saying, "We need her on Atomic Energy or Foreign Affairs."

Rudd Rohde was eight when her mother came to Washington as a Florida representative and took an apartment in the Methodist Building bordering on the Capitol grounds. "She not only haunted her mother's office and the galleries," recalls a family friend, Bess Furman of *The New York Times*, then an AP reporter covering Congress. "She also used to beg her mother to bring home bills which she read in the raw as other children read fairy tales."

When her mother became US Minister to Denmark, Rudd was known to Americans in Copenhagen as the little girl who was equally at home chasing butterflies or chatting with the Chief Justice of Denmark. Ten years later, a graduate of private prep schools and Barnard, she went with similar virtuosity from one school-teaching job in West Virginia to another in Baghdad, and, during the war, from an Army job at Middle East headquarters in Cairo to a WAVE career as a communications officer at the Washington Navy Yard. In the early postwar years she worked as a technical editor on a Rockefeller-supported project at the University of Chicago Institute for Nuclear Studies. There she and Harrison Brown met. Brown is a Caltech geochemist who helped last spring to shift public opinion against the Strauss-Teller axis in the Atomic Energy Commission. In a well-timed speech and in Congressional testimony he charged that Teller was "willfully distorting" the facts on the dangers of fallout and on the feasibility of an adequate nuclear tests detection system.

The issues Mrs. Brown is emphasizing are not only those one would expect in a recession-minded partly industrial district—broadened unemployment coverage, opposition to "union-wrecking legislation"—but others appropriate to one whose entry into politics was inspired by Adlai Stevenson's candidacy in 1952. ("Your understanding of world problems . . . your close association with the educational and scientific communities . . . are very much needed," Stevenson wired her after her primary victory.) Federal aid for school construction and scholarships head her list of campaign pledges. She stresses the need for international control of nuclear weapons but deplores the fact that in the absence of such control the US has lost its scientific and technological lead.

JEFFERY COHELAN—California's Seventh Congressional District, across the bay from San Francisco, is the home of the Berkeley campus of the University of California and of a sizable and well-organized labor movement. Since 1946 the Seventh, which is also the home of the Knowland family's *Oakland Tribune*, has been represented in Congress by conservative Republican John J. Allen. This year the Democrats hope to unseat

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Allen with a candidate whose career has been shaped by both the University and the labor movement.

Forty-four-year-old Jeffery Cohelan is a member of the Berkeley City Council and Secretary-Treasurer of Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees Local 302 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. But Cohelan opposed Hoffa at the last national convention. He stood alone as the one leader in the Teamsters' Western Conference who refused to approve a vote of confidence in the top Teamster officials in 1957.

His activity in the labor movement dates from 1937, when the depression forced him to give up a college football scholarship and work in a warehouse. "There were always guys waiting outside for your job. All you had to do was fail to make some quota and you were out. Everyone was always scared he was going to lose his job."

Cohelan kept up part-time studies at the University and finished an undergraduate course in labor economics in 1950, and in 1953 he studied British trade unionism at the University of Leeds on a Fulbright Scholarship. But he is distrustful of academic liberals who are interested only in the Big Issues. "Where are they," says Cohelan speaking of his service as a city councilman, "when the city council is considering sewers and street repairs? You can bet your life the Chamber of Commerce is always represented, but where are the liberals?"

Cohelan has a reputation comparable to Senator Humphrey's—of being a compulsive talker: "We all know that Jeff is never lacking in the oratory department," says an article in Local 302's newsletter. In conversation he is a rambler, sprinkling his remarks with words like "adumbration"—which he uses correctly and appropriately, but which comes as a surprise. Cohelan, in fact, just doesn't conform to conventional images of a labor leader or of a student of labor economics. He is somewhere in between. His appeal seems to be equally strong in the low-income Democratic strongholds and in middle-class suburbs. Cross-filing on both the Republican and Democratic ballots, he pulled 49 percent of the total district vote in the primary.

So far Cohelan has centered his campaign on the recession issue, emphasizing Democratic answers to the widespread unemployment in the Seventh District. But in the face of a hostile Knowland-owned press in his community he is also an outspoken opponent of any curbs on the Warren Court; an advocate of a federal FEPC, and a mild critic of the Dulles China policy.

JOSEPH KARTH—A big-framed, 36-year-old member of the Minnesota legislature won the Democratic nomination for the St. Paul seat vacated by Eugene McCarthy after one of the worst local party brawls in years. St. Paul is heavily Democratic—GOP candidate Frank Farrell is not given much chance—and it is also, as one citizen puts it, "a very Catholic town." Karth and his Catholic ex-wife were divorced eleven years ago; the Mayor of St. Paul, Joseph Dillon, didn't hesitate to make the most of this when he ran against Karth in the primary. In winning a two-to-one victory over the popular mayor, Karth seems to bear out the claims of those who say he's a man of unusual capacity—or at any rate endurance. (He campaigned literally 18 hours a day.)

Like the milder Cohelan in California, Karth rose from the ranks; he began as a worker—one of the first declared unionists—at Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, and is now an International Representative of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' Union. But unlike Cohelan, he has no academic refinements. He's not a polished speaker, and his understanding—and convictions—in complex matters of economics and politics come not out of any formal training but out of experience as a labor negotiator and a Democratic leader in the state legislature. Volatile, with a kind of Germanic stubbornness ("he wants to be absolutely sure of the facts, and will irritate people by questioning their sources and reliability"), Karth is known as an overpowering bargainer not only in labor circles ("probably the best in our whole union") but in legislative conference committees.

HERMAN TOLL—"Solid," "serious," and "decent" are the three words that turn up in most conversations about the Democratic Congressional candidate in Pennsylvania's Sixth District—a protégé and ally of Sen. Joseph Clark and Philadelphia Mayor Richardson Dilworth. Unlike incumbent Congressman—and presently Senatorial candidate—Hugh Scott, whose base was swank Chestnut Hill, Herman Toll's strength lies in the middle-class Jewish neighborhoods which make up as much as one-third of the District. "His record on Israel" was always Hugh Scott's hold on a substantial Jewish vote, but in choosing their new nominee the Republicans this year seem to be surrendering in advance to Toll's years of service in Jewish charitable causes. (GOP candidate Frederick Gartner, as a Congressman in the thirties, successfully defended himself in court against charges of pro-Bundist activity, but the memory lingers.)

Toll is a prominent 51-year-old attorney who has built his political career around rather than through Congressman William Green's city Democratic machine. In Philadelphia the Mayor's—and Senator's—office are normally at odds with County Chairman Green. Toll is the first Clark-Dilworth man to get a party ticket for Congress. In Harrisburg he worked for city-county consolidation for Philadelphia—the major good government issue separating Clark and Dilworth from Green—and co-sponsored Pennsylvania's state FEPC legislation.

NEXT: *Joseph Freehill (Va.), A. I. Johnson (Minn.), Fred Betz (Colo.), Quentin Burdick (N. Dak.), Neal Smith (Iowa), Robert Domme (Kans.), Anthony Akers and John Lindsay (N. Y.).*

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Eleanor Roosevelt's Life

by Donald Meyer

TWENTY-ONE years ago, at the height of the New Deal, Eleanor Roosevelt published what became the first volume of an autobiography, *This Is My Story*. It was a remarkable book, in its timing, its author and its revelations.

Even in 1937 it was becoming clear that the New Deal centered on a man and not on some one or another set of policies, and it was therefore easy to read Mrs. Roosevelt's book about herself for the light it might shed on her husband. The same thing was still more true of her second volume, *This I Remember,* published in 1949 and closing with her departure from Washington after F.D.R.'s death. Not only was it easy to do so; it was—and is—wise to do so. Every scrap of reminiscence of Roosevelt will be precious in the deepening study of the New Deal, but I hazard the view—and it is not really so hazardous—that Mrs. Roosevelt's own insight into her husband's character as a politician will prove to be the theme upon which all other interpretations will be variations. This in itself, though, along with much else, should suggest that her books are important most of all, not because they tell about famous men and grand events from a unique perspective, but because they tell about Eleanor Roosevelt. We now have her third volume, *On My Own*, covering the years since the White House, the great man departed, the glamor of steady association with power subdued. It is no less significant than the others; in fact, it is the most remarkable of the three, a fascinating climax to one of the striking autobiographies of our literature.

On My Own, by Eleanor Roosevelt (Harper; $4).

It seems to me that what we have to do with here is a very fine mind. Its quality is not in a conventional mold, so it can be mistaken for something else: sensitivity, a liberal and generous spirit, woman's intuition. Mrs. Roosevelt has these, certainly, but she also has what these do not normally imply, a penetrating, powerful and persistent realism. *On My Own* has much to do with politics and politicians of course—the United Nations, American foreign policy, the Democratic Party, Adlai Stevenson, Tito, Khrushchev. As she talks of such men and matters, one gradually realizes two important things: Mrs. Roosevelt speaks without rhetoric, and she speaks with precision. To say the same thing in a more fashionable way: Mrs. Roosevelt has a mind that is free of ideology. In an age hardly able to think for itself, let alone communicate, except in the clichés of organized power, the resources of such a mind ought to be comprehended.

Mrs. Roosevelt's narrative not only of her experiences but of her tactics during her years in the UN is in effect a formulation of the gyroscopic balance between inflated illusion and narrow gamesmanship, a balance implacably demanded of anyone who really wants to be responsible in the largest affairs of our time. In the course of her telling, she succeeds, amazingly, in making of the methods of the UN—that tediously pedantic object of maddeningly loose hopes —something vital. She knows the difference between action and those imitations of action flaunted in the grandiose jargon of our ideology-cursed era: "two worlds," "East versus West," "coexistence," "containment," "massive retaliation," "free world versus slave world," "the principles of freedom," "atheistic Communism," and the like. She simply does not need such rhetoric in order to project her understanding.

AS A CONSEQUENCE, Mrs. Roosevelt is the perfect anti-Communist. "I think I should die if I had to live in Soviet Russia," she says, and she knows why. At the same time, she knows that 200-million people do live in Soviet Russia, and 500-million in Red China, and she knows that her reasons for finding Communism deadening are not the reasons several hundred million other people in the world are going to have if—and she knows it is an "if"—they do not give themselves to Communist rule. Mrs. Roosevelt is not bemused by that marvelous egocentricity which imagines that if only the American Way of Life can be "sold" to aspiring millions all will be well. And she knows the difference between ends and means. One case in point is the Japanese constitution imposed after the war by—among others—the generalissimo of American ideologues, to the continuing bewilderment of a people with traditions, symbols and resources that were evidently unworthy of the notice of military idealists. In her comments on the absurdity of MacArthur's constitution, as well as upon the tasks that face us in India, Indonesia, Greece and elsewhere, Mrs. Roosevelt recalls to one's mind the tradition of our best liberal leaders, who knew that politics—not even liberal politics—is not fine ideals, but patient application to things as they are. All else is adolescence—fantasy without responsibility.

BUT, of course, there is more than politics in *On My Own*. The book opens with the fading echoes of her personal emotional life touched upon with delicacy, yet with the awesome directness and detachment of the earlier volumes. The thing that seems to me compelling is quite simple: the poise and power of Mrs. Roosevelt's mind are the fruits of a long struggle for personal identity. And here, it seems to me, one can find her realism united to her experience as a woman.

It has nothing to do with genes, chromosomes, the "eternal woman" or anything constitutional, but with something social and as old as our civilization: the assumption that heroes of abstract thought should be men, with women left to tend the particular. This may someday be felt to have been a tragic split, for it has helped allow men to pervert the powers of abstract imagination into romantic, fanatic political ideologies, and women, excluded from the glorious affairs of abstract principle to languish in a few realms where politics has not usually invaded — home, boudoir, Sunday school. Mrs. Roosevelt has not escaped such restrictions by learning the tricks of abstract imagination, by be-

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coming, that is, more like a man. Rather, she has extended her own imagination, shaped by her experiences as a woman, into male domains. This is the long story of the three volumes taken together. Despite every reason in her early life to do so, and despite every reason in her middle life to do so, she never lost her sense of being someone different from the patterns expected of her by others. Her father, her parent-less youth, the patterns of New York "society," mother-in-law, children, stricken husband, governor, and President—they all dominated her. "I was lost somewhere deep down inside myself," she said, in *This I Remember,* quite objectively, without complaint. Nor did she, in the manner of the "emancipated woman," ever rebel. What she did, over years and years, first in New York City, then in New York State, then in the nation, was to find her identity gradually not in some pattern all her own, but precisely in the process of comprehending other people's patterns. In *On My Own*, the process is expanded to the international scale.

THE ANSWER to the question that lurks in the earlier volumes then—"who is the 'real' Mrs. Roosevelt behind all her roles?"—is different from the usual answers to such questions. Usually, the "real" person turns out to be someone different. We are all alerted to the falseness of public images. In Mrs. Roosevelt's case, the answer is that there is no answer. Her pattern is to exhibit in herself how the conflict, complexity and passion of other patterns can be accommodated in the reach of a single mind. The result of her long search for herself appears to be that, in the ordinary sense, she has no self. Instead, she is now freely what she always was, a kind of synthesis provided for others. Visiting a primitive Ettu village in Japan, where the people were doomed to "the lowest and most degrading work," she learned, she says, "how important it is to recognize that there is a bond among all peoples." That is what Mrs. Roosevelt's life has been—the recognition of bond.

Here is one of the defenses against ideology and its separation of peoples—a "horizontal" defense so to speak, renewing in a classic tradition the ideal of community, ultimately universal. It contrasts with a second sort of defense, a more "vertical" defense, renewing the ideal of individual integrity. Efforts at recovering vitality for individuals in all their privacy, uniqueness and existential depth, as against the invasions of organization, other-direction and political abstractions have become the motif of our post-liberal confusion. No longer the monopoly of literary men and a few agonized prophets, these attempts to restore a sense of depth are often desperately anti- as well as non-political, anti- as well as post-liberal, charging the liberal spirit with being too cool, thin, impersonal and uncomplicated for the times. Such charges are hardly baseless, such animus is hardly unmerited, and we feel the contrast between depth and breadth, between politics and symbols vital to the self, as more than an inevitable tension but as a schism in the soul.

MRS. ROOSEVELT'S sort of vision in breadth includes little of this other passion for depth. She herself is always busy, rarely alone, for the most part coolly and impersonally reasonable. But the realism of her spirit does suggest one quality that is probably a condition for any easing of the schism. This is the strength to be patient. William Carlos Williams once suggested that the immense political patience of Washington was linked to an immense control in Washington's inner life; for Lincoln, Williams found the magnificent image of the comforting Mother, exhibiting Lincoln's power to absorb the patterns of millions into himself as the definition of what he really was. It has been a basic resource of our nation so far that in moments of crisis we have supported leaders of such essentially non-ideological politics-in-breadth. No one imagines these men to have lacked depth. And it would be foolish to call them "selfless" in the moral sense. Washington always nursed his "honor" jealously; Lincoln's ambition, as Herndon said, pulsed like a little machine. Nor was the last of our geniuses of patient synthesis, Franklin Roosevelt himself, without the impulses of ambition. Neither sanctity nor coolness is the secret. Strength is. The elusiveness that eventually confronts every effort to find the "real" man in these cases derives at least partly from the spectacle of men so strong in themselves that they can forget themselves and become the fulfillment of others. Breadth and depth are united, without need for the rigid security of ideology. Such elusiveness is nothing less than spellbinding in a woman whose self-forgetful strength has expanded to gather in a world.

Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution

by Paul Willen

UNHAPPILY, the Hungarian Revolution, now almost two years old, has as yet produced no literature which really measures up to the vastness and consequence of the event itself: no Malraux, or Hemingway among the novelists; no Orwell among the political writers; no John Reed among the foreign observers; no Trotsky among the participants. It may be hoped that this does not mean that this great human upheaval will soon be forgotten; but the fact is that the literature of this revolution will do little to perpetuate its memory.

Imre Nagy on Communism (Praeger; $5.50).

A case in point is the last political testament of the very man who presided so bravely over the revolution, Imre Nagy, Hungary's most notable public figure since Kossuth, whose brutal execution last June caused such profound international shock. Nagy was a man of unquestioned courage and great devotion to his people, but he was neither a writer nor a man who really comes off well in print.

This testament, written in 1955 after his first premiership (The New Course), has appeared in this country under the title of *Imre Nagy on Communism*. It is a plodding, repetitive, earnest defense of Nagy's political record, which was then under sharp attack by the ill-fated Rakosi cabal. Certainly the case he makes against Rakosi is a good one; not even Khrushchev dares today to reimpose Rakosi on the Hungarian people. And likewise, Nagy's repeated insistence

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that only a resumption of the post-Stalin reforms could save Hungary from disaster is well documented and firmly stated. In this sense this book is a prophetic one which, combined with his two premierships, clearly documents Nagy's important niche in the history of his country and of eastern Europe.

And yet his testament lacks depth and insight; as well as vivacity and humor. It is an angry indictment written by a man seemingly unaware, or uninterested in, the deeper causes of human actions; it contains no analysis of causes and effects, nor any effort to get behind the clichés of Rakosi's personal megalomania. He does not relate himself, or his cause, to the vaster movements of contemporary history; nor does he appear to have even a glimpse of the complex mechanics of international politics.

But these are points of analysis which can well be argued. What is really most disappointing about Nagy is the complete absence of humor, "the human touch," and sometimes this means that in his personal defense he can even be somewhat petty. In one of his New Course speeches he had referred to the solidarity of "nine and a half million Hungarians;" and his enemies pointed to this as evidence that he recognized no class enemies, but included all Hungarians. He angrily denied the charge, noting that the last census showed that there were 9.8 million Hungarians, of whom he estimated that approximately 300,000 were kulaks, unrecalcitrant bourgeois etc.; and thus, he explained, he arrived at his figure of 9.5 million!

De mortuis nil nisi bonum. This is especially true of a man who, like Nagy, gave his last full measure for his people. Yet the fact remains that something of the human grandeur was missing in this man; and his utter failure to realize that there was something fantastic and impossible about having a Communist Premier preside over an anti-Communist revolution may well reflect a confusion of the Hungarian people the absence of which in Poland led that country to another political conclusion.

But the problem here is literature, not politics; and we are led back to the question we posed at the start: why this notable literary vacuum? One tentative hypothesis may be advanced. Historically, great revolutions were made against great autocracies, built by strong dynasties, supported by a magnificent church. Intellectual titans breed rebellious children of a similar stamp and genius who rise to overthrow their progenitors in their time of trouble. In this case our dynasty is the Stalinist one, represented here by Matyas Rakosi; and the rebellious child is Imre Nagy. It is then perhaps a measure of the intellectual poverty of Stalinism that its opponents have proven to be men with so little of that articulate greatness one associates with revolution.

Civil Disobedience in Montgomery

by Harold R. Isaacs

REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., the leader of the first significant and successful effort to apply the principles and tactics of Gandhi to the Negro struggle for equal rights in this country, is lying in a Harlem hospital, victim of a near-fatal stab wound inflicted by an unbalanced Negro woman. It is not yet clear under what delusions the woman acted, but she has been quoted as saying that she wanted no part of integration. In any case, anyone who is looking for pregnant parallels has a new coincidence to conjure with; Gandhi also was struck down by a Hindu fanatic who feared that Gandhi's doctrine of love threatened his orthodoxy.

Stride Toward Freedom, by Martin Luther King, Jr. (Harper; $2.95).

Certainly from this modest little book —he was signing copies of it in a Harlem store when he was attacked—no one would get the idea that Martin Luther King felt the Gandhian mantle settling around his shoulders. As he tells it, the leadership of the historic bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, in 1956, was thrust upon him. He was the new pastor of a Montgomery church, his Boston Ph.D. still crinkling new, his work in the South just beginning, when Mrs. Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat to a white passenger and started a train of events that soon had the attention of the whole world. Dr. King was elected leader and spokesman for the boycott that sprang up all but spontaneously among Montgomery's 50,000 Negroes. They chose, as the saying went, to have tired feet instead of tired souls. A year later the United States Supreme Court struck down the whole system of discrimination on transportation systems in Southern cities.

Dr. King emerges from his own account as a spokesman for the new spirit among Negroes of the South. "I neither started the protest nor suggested it," he writes, "I simply responded to the call of the people for a spokesman." But before he was through, he had become the chief educator and inspirer of a movement that led the Negro "to take a fresh look at himself." He had been arrested, fingerprinted, and jailed, his home had been bombed, he had gone through a number of crises of disaffection and discouragement within his own group and crises of fear and fatigue in himself. But he had also become a new Negro leader, known from one end of the country to the other and beyond it to all points of the globe.

WHEN he was put on trial during the boycott, correspondents from Europe and Asia sat in the courtroom. There was in this a curious rounding of an historic circle. The Gandhi-like boycott in Montgomery inspired a similar movement in a city of distant South Africa where, half a century ago, Gandhi first developed, among his persecuted fellow-Indians, the tactics of non-violent resistance. But Gandhi, in his turn, always acknowledged his debt to Henry Thoreau's famous essay, "On Civil Disobedience," and Dr. King, who tells of reading Thoreau while he was still a student, became the first to bring Thoreau's idea, as developed by Gandhi, back to its home soil. Montgomery's Negroes gave a new meaning to the idea that a man ceases to be a slave the moment he stops cooperating in his own subjection.

Dr. King throws down a rigorous challenge to American white society and to Negroes. He calls on his fellow Christians to be Christians, his fellow-democrats to be democrats, and he asks right-thinking whites and his fellow-Negroes to join him in refusing to cooperate with evil. He is not going to get a ready

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response from any of these quarters. The Christians have been slow in coming to grips with their religious professions, the democrats are having an even harder time, and among Negroes the process of reassertion is still one of great inner conflict, uncertainty, division, and impulses to strike back.

ART

Jack Levine: The Degrees of Corruption

If the complete history of this country's brief plunge into government-patronized art is ever compiled, a striking and inescapable conclusion will concern the difference in over-all tone between the theatre and movie projects and the painting projects. Of the movies you remember poetic and powerful special pleading for conservation and flood control policies. In the theatre new techniques combined with new social thought to produce the Living Newspaper, outright propaganda for the New Deal in agriculture and against the Nine Old Men, epic theatre based on the fact that syphilis can be cured. In painting, by and large, the results were an endless proliferation of historical and geographical post office murals and a superabundance of easel painting recording the visual facts of America in the thirties.

The difference may stem from the basic fact that theatre and movies are group enterprises; the spirit of the times was certainly one of group activity; the collection of writers, actors, designers, electricians, and cameramen could easily feel that their own working together echoed the larger effort of the nation. The painter, alone with his eye and his hand, pretty much put down what he saw or, in the post offices, constructed respectful images of the early settlers.

Happily there were some distinguished exceptions to this rule and among them was Jack Levine. In 1937, at the age of 22, Levine embarked on a program of political analysis by way of imaginative, characterizing portraiture that is still going on. In that year, for the WPA, he painted "The Feast of Pure Reason," which is now in the Museum of Modern Art. The content sounds like an IWW caricature. A millionaire, a city boss and a tough cop sit at their ease, the complacent, massive heads held by the reversed triangle of a richly framed painting on the wall, a decanter in the foreground and a plaster "Winged Victory" between the cop and the politician. The painting is an absolutely pitiless response to the cruelty and insensitivity of its subjects and the perversion of the democratic idea they represent. Levine's "Syndicate," painted two years later, employs two of the same characters with a wardheeler instead of a cop, but seems inflated and flabby compared to the first picture.

While that particular statement was made once for all in one of his first important paintings, Levine was by no means finished with the big city politician. And it is interesting to notice how often ceremonial eating and drinking affords the moment of observation. "Welcome Home," in the Brooklyn Museum is a public dinner for a returned general who salts his celery with infinite care and who is served by an aging waiter whose body is a masterpiece of obsequious grace.

"Election Night," in the Modern, uses Levine's almost patented compressed space to assemble victorious politicos whooping it up surrounded by a statuesque cigarette girl, a bellhop and an embracing couple. The compressed space makes it possible for the picture to yield person after person hidden in Levine's technique of the blurred image and in his embellishment of what might be called a "white writing" that has something to say.

This "writing" comes from the glint of light on crystal, or rhinestones, or folds of fabric. It appears in a lot of Levine's work but is at its best in "Reception in Miami" in the Hirshhorn collection, one of the dozen or so major works of the painter. The scene once more is a public place, and for a change, the principal characters are people we know by name, the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, presented as a pair of expressionless mummies who must be rolled about on wheels. Curtsying are a pair of awestruck American ladies. To the right an old Levine type plays the headwaiter, snapping his fingers for an underling. Behind, baroque stairs, columns, arches, balustrades, chandeliers; spang in the center foreground, a little dog who scratches his ear and thus repeats the curtsy. Over the whole thing the white writing glistens and swoops in a rhythm of its own.

Levine's most monumental painting is "The Trial," in the Art Institute of Chicago, done five years ago. The picture is hung next to Winslow Homer's magnificent "Herring Net" and the juxtaposition suggests an American antecedent for the white writing. The Institute owns the drawings for "The Trial" and I went through them recently, but they are little more than notes or blueprints for the picture. In them appears a sketch labelled "The eyes of J. Donald Coster," and these may have survived as the eyes of the judge, to whom the whole structure pyramids. The weariness of time and power are once more present in the faces, but the artist's judgment is now withheld.

Perhaps it is less a question of judgment withheld than of a perception that goes beyond judging. The effort in Levine's late work is clearly to understand all—not to forgive all, but simply to grasp the truth, part of which is certainly ignored at "The Feast of Pure Reason." In terms of subject matter, this restraint may be expected in the series of exquisite little portraits of Hebraic kings and teachers, but it comes as a distinct shock in Levine's recent salute to General Franco, "The Turnkey." Alone in the white-washed prison interior, surrounded by old-fashioned gimcrackery, the decorated, jackbooted general is corrupt and slightly ridiculous, but there is also a recognition of the uneasiness and loneliness of the man.

Levine's task, thematically, has been to take the measure of the corruption wrought by power. Upon his success rests a large part of our time's claim to artistic achievement beyond corruption.

FRANK GETLEIN

Notes on Contributors

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MOVIES

Hollywood and Hemingway

THE APPEARANCE of the film version of *The Old Man and the Sea* reminded me that Ernest Hemingway, probably the best-known and surely the most influential of all American novelists, has written only one novel with an American setting. Many of his short stories, of course, take place here, but only *To Have and Have Not* among his novels is set (in part) in America. Also, although there are many American men in his books, all his novels except that one have exotic heroines.

The Old Man and the Sea (Warner).

These facts are more than curiosities, I believe—they are revealing. In discussing Tennessee Williams (*NR*, September 29), I suggested that it may be the lack of large-scale emotional material in conventional American life that has driven him to the neurotic fringes of society. A similar sense that his dramatic scope could not be thoroughly tried by the American scene may have sent Hemingway—not, in his case, to neurotica—to foreign countries. Foreign heroines followed logically. Besides, they have ready-made mystery and romance; and an ultra-masculine, realistic, rhinoceros-hunting author is interested in women principally as romantic images.

Every strength has an attendant possible weakness. If Hemingway found large themes for his large talent, he succumbed to a certain travel-snobbism. (You there in Omaha, don't you wish you were here with me in this Paris *bistro* or Pamplona *cantina?* Here, I toss you a few foreign phrases and names of wines and streets to dream with.) In addition, his alien view has led him to overvalue certain discoveries. For instance, in Spanish one does indeed say "thou" to friends and one speaks of "the Tigers of Detroit," but Spanish-speaking people don't think that remarkable. You don't often find those forms in good translations of Spanish works; the translator tries to render another language truly (to use one of Hemingway's pet words) in English.

Hemingway, however, taken with the novelty of the forms and the thrill of being away from home, "thou's" us and insists on a diminishingly effective pseudo-Biblical simplicity. At bottom, there is in this a wide-eyed juvenile wonder combined with a professional's glee at finding a pocket of quaint material to mine. Any writer—though he be as serious and as marvelously gifted as Hemingway—who spends the bulk of his life away from the place where he grew up runs the risk of getting his values slightly wrong. Even of Henry James, the emperor of expatriates, there is the story that when he died a duchess said, "Poor Mr. James. He never did meet quite the right people."

Hemingway's short novel, *The Old Man and the Sea,* is a good example of his virtues and faults. The story itself is straight, clean, heroic, and ironic. A man journeys out on the faceless sea (a capsule Ahab), fights, wins, then loses: but really wins because he has had the courage to fight and to lose. Fine. But through the story Hemingway, both the Wide-eyed and the Gleeful Exploiter, comes peeping in too often. The sense of contrition before simplicity, plus the pervasive feeling that the author is a man with motor cars and lawyers who is "getting back to fundamentals," is damaging to the art of the piece.

IT IS REMARKABLE how these virtues and faults are paralleled in the film of *The Old Man.* The director (John Sturges) and the screen adapter (Peter Viertel) have hewn faithfully to the story line. This is feasible even though the drama is largely internal because much of the Old Man's inner conflict is given voice on the sound track—by Spencer Tracy who plays the part. Moreover, a great deal of the papier-mâché peasant grandeur has been shorn away by the necessity for condensation. But it has been replaced by Tracy's papier-mâché performance.

Tracy has had a long career in films as a kind of American Jean Gabin; and although his work has degenerated somewhat into mannerism, a slow-blinking, taciturn competence that is by now predictable and slightly boring, still he has often been highly effective. But his performance in this film demonstrates that he has made his reputation in very carefully tailored roles and that he is not, in the best sense, an actor at all; he is a "behaver." He has spent his life behaving credibly in front of a camera, and if that is not a small achievement, neither is it a great one.

As the Old Man, his hair has been clipped and dyed white, he has put on pajama-like Cuban clothes and he walks about barefoot, but he carries with him always fifty films in which he tipped his fedora back and was urbanely sage. This is not to say that an actor is condemned to a small field because he has made his mark in it or because of his personality; but Tracy has very little as a performer besides the ability to market his personality. It is not the Old Man's personality; and as we often feel impatience in the book with an author who has knowingly "gone simple," so with Tracy we feel that at any moment, having tired of the masquerade, he may reach into the

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bottom of his boat, pick up a radiophone and summon his motor cruiser. He has not even taken the trouble to adapt his speech to the part. In his casual American accent, the short declarative sentences frequently sound incongruous.

This is the closest to a one-man cast that I can remember seeing, so it is easy to understand why a huge box-office name was sought for the part. But, despite the film's merits, the producer has insured his venture at the price of a central failure. With Anthony Quinn as the Old Man or (to judge by *God's Little Acre*) Robert Ryan, this picture might have been an extremely moving experience, for in place of the excised soft spots, we would have had artistic iron.

James Wong Howe's color photography of the sea is excellent; outstanding among numerous beautiful scenes is one of a fleet of small fishing boats starting out just before dawn, each with a lantern on its mast. Some of the special effects are poor; it is obvious when a studio close-up has been superimposed on a location shot. Sturges' direction is only fair. Perhaps no director could have had much effect on Tracy, but Sturges has contributed a few heavy-handed touches of his own. The dream scenes of the African coast are needlessly literal, and a really egregious blunder is the moment when the weary Old Man, bearing his mast on his shoulder, trudges up the street and stumbles to his knees before a church door. I almost heard a voice whisper: "Get it? Station of the cross!!"

However it would be misleading to leave the impression that this is in sum a cheap or shoddy film. Considerable intelligent devotion to the book has gone into it, and much of the clarity and cadence of Hemingway at his best has been captured. But no matter how good the complementary elements are, *The Old Man* without a completely convincing, epic fisherman must be disappointing.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

dates. This is inevitable in campaign times and expresses a belief in the thaumaturgic effect of ghostwriting — *e.g.*, that if Mr. Hogan of New York reads a speech written by Judge Rosenman, or Mr. Dodd of Connecticut reads one written by a team of Yale Law School professors, the experience somehow turns them into liberals. If there are those who honestly believe that Mr. Hogan (whose champion, Mr. D. M. Sklar, conceded my statement that Mr. Hogan had "hardly voiced a public thought on a national issue in half a century"), Mr. Dodd, Governor Furcolo (who once proposed a committee of governors to mediate the integration question between the Governor of Arkansas and the President of the United States) and the like represent reliable and creative liberalism, there is obviously nothing I can say now to dissuade them!

This is not to say that they may not be preferable to their opponents, as is plainly the case with Mr. Hogan and very likely with the others. Nor is it to say that professional politicians—in my article, I expressly instanced Mayor Lawrence in Pennsylvania (*pace* Professor R. F. Schier) are not amply qualified for high office. But it is to suggest—and would my critics really contest this?—that, if the Senate Democratic majority were to be composed of Hogans and Dodds, I doubt very much whether the Democratic Party would supply the imaginative leadership which this country and world so badly need. I can only regret the fact when liberal Democrats, under the stress of campaign enthusiasm, lose their ability to see a material difference, say, between a Finletter and a Hogan, between a Bowles and a Dodd.

The other category of objections has to do with the proper role of intellectuals in politics. I pass over the arguments that liberals should be grateful for the opportunities afforded them by the regulars, that only the naïve or the ignorant would doubt the decisions of bosses, and the like. There is little more shaming than the intellectual in politics who suddenly becomes far more "realistic" than any professional. Of course both professionals and intellectuals are indispensable; I would object as much to the intellectuals who would try to ban the pros, if any were so mad as to attempt to do so, as I do to the pros who try to ban the intellectuals. One of the most rewarding experiences I have ever had was working with Jim Finnegan in the 1956 campaign. I would even suggest that professionals like Mr. Finnegan, the late Paul Dever, Colonel Arvey and Mr. John Bailey might have a higher regard for the role of the liberal intellectual than does Mr. P. R. Shaw.

The New Republic's own comment seemed to me excessively mysterious. The editorial purported to make two points. The first was that "a public servant with one or more college degrees is not necessarily a good one." Any assertion that college degrees guarantee superior public service would, of course, be absurd, and no such assertion has ever been made by me, in this article or anywhere else. After all, I have to associate with PhD's every day! I am thus not clear to whom the first editorial point was addressed, and I accept no responsibility for it.

"The second point," the editorial states,

> . . . is that before one dismisses the Democratic Party as a conveyor belt for the ideas of intellectuals, one should recall that even during the first Roosevelt Administration . . . Frankfurter's "unhappy hot dogs" often found the back door as well as the front door of the White House closed to them.

I might question the assertion that there were "often" times in the first term when New Dealers could not even get through the back door; but no matter. The paragraph concludes: "For Mr. Roosevelt knew well how to live with the De Sapios and the Arveys." Of course Roosevelt knew how to live with the bosses; but living with them never meant for him unquestioning acceptance of their decisions; nor does the fact that Roosevelt lived with Ed Flynn constitute any argument for liberals today surrendering their independent judgment to Carmine De Sapio—or any guarantee that De Sapio will keep that old conveyor belt going.

I must confess some astonishment over the almost masochistic relish with which some liberals rush to the task of defending political bosses against liberal criticism. Is it *lèse majesté* in *The New Republic* to question the wisdom of Carmine De Sapio? Let me make my own position clear: I am wholly in favor of "living with" the organizations. But I

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know no quicker way to dissipate the influence of the liberal than to accept all organization decisions as infallible. I know no better way for liberals to earn the contempt of the pros than to use their talents to discern transcendent virtues in candidates whom the pros themselves regard with private scorn. And I know no surer way to wreck the Democratic Party than to relinquish it to people—whether candidates or bosses—who have shown negligible interest in the ideas and purposes which made that party great.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
Cambridge, Mass.

► *More Quarrels with Schlesinger*

SIRS:

SO FAR as Connecticut is concerned, Mr. Schlesinger's article on "Death Wish of the Democrats" is clearly unfair in characterizing Tom Dodd, the Democratic nominee for United States Senator, as a second-rater. He was, according to my information, both anti-Franco and anti-McCarthy, which was fairly easy for non-Catholics, but not so easy for Catholics. Senator Kennedy, for example, did not vote, have himself paired or his position announced on the resolution censuring McCarthy. Dodd's record while in Congress showed that he was a consistent liberal following the New Deal-Fair Deal line. . . .

In a state where Catholics and Protestants literally come to blows at legislative hearings for birth control legislation, and where religious feeling runs high in towns where the issue of paying for bus transportation for parochial school students is decided by local referendum, the Democratic political leaders are not wrong in seeking a Catholic nominee for the Senate to oppose the incumbent Republican senator who is a Catholic.

ALFRED BAKER LEWIS
Old Greenwich, Conn.

" . . . academic liberals"

I CANNOT AGREE with Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., that Governor Foster Furcolo is an illiberal Governor, uninterested in issues. Furcolo has, for example, designed the most ambitious program for the expansion of state higher education since Horace Mann, a $111 million program including the establishment of nine new junior colleges across the state. . . . Furcolo has also offered one of the most important programs in reform of the state system of prisons—a *bete noire* of every state government. His plan will set up a $5 million psychiatric classification and treatment center for all prisoners and juvenile offenders —something no other state has done, and a proposal which many national psychiatric and correction authorities have praised.

As a former active ADAer, I think the real problem is that too few academic liberals really try to understand the difficult technical problems of state or local government. Thus they cannot be helpful on these levels, where the political leaders are developed who then go on to the federal level which Schlesinger is most concerned with. In American politics, a man must serve an apprenticeship on the local or state level before going to Washington as a Congressman or Senator. Too few academic liberals (at least in Massachusetts) seem willing to make this choice, but they should then not be surprised to be left out when Senate seats are awarded by their party.

BEN MOORE
Boston, Mass.

► *Government Security Commission*

SIRS:

I WAS PLEASED to see Mr. Walter Dillon Jr.'s article on the government security program in your issue of September 8, 1958. Mr. Dillon calls attention to the Commission on Government Security and its report now over a year old, and deplores the fact that not a single change based on the Commission's $750,000 report has been made in any government department or agency. Mr. Dillon seems to want a revision of the excesses of the security program in the direction of individual rights, but he can hardly expect to get it by carrying out the Commission's recommendations. Among other things the Commission would: extend loyalty measures to cover the legislative and executive branches of the government and civil air transport, set up a Central Security office, legalize wire-tapping, provide statutory authority for the attorney general's list, etc.

Mr. Dillon questioned the "bi-partisanship" of the Commission; a more serious question relates to the Commission staff of which both the administrative director and his assistant were retired FBI men who could hardly be impartial when reviewing procedures which involved their own careers.

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